ALGORITHM FOR THE FORMATION OF MILITARY-ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER HYBRID THREATS
Abstract
This article examines the theoretical and practical foundations of developing a state’s military-economic policy under conditions of hybrid threats. It provides a comprehensive analysis of classical and contemporary concepts of international conflicts, security transformations, and strategic studies, which explain the nature of interstate confrontations through changes in the balance of power, disparities in capabilities, external shocks, and emerging global challenges. The study emphasizes the importance of integrating multidimensional factors—including geopolitical dynamics, economic resilience, and technological innovations—into the formulation of effective defense and economic strategies. The necessity of transitioning from a traditional resource-production approach to a comprehensive, algorithmic model is substantiated. This model integrates strategic planning, assessment of threats and national capabilities, formulation of defense requirements, efficient resource allocation, budgetary and industrial policy coordination, as well as institutional and regulatory support for decision-making. A structured and phased algorithm for military-economic policy formation is proposed, covering the assessment of the strategic environment, defining of long-term strategic objectives, operationalization of defense tasks, resource mobilization, action prioritization, legislative and institutional support, and implementation of industrial and technological initiatives. The article demonstrates that the effectiveness of military-economic policy is determined by the state’s ability to ensure strategic adaptability, economic resilience, modernization of the defense-industrial complex, and integration into international security and cooperation mechanisms. The scientific novelty lies in the development of a holistic algorithmic model for informed decision-making in the field of military-economic policy under conditions of complex hybrid confrontations, which allows states to anticipate emerging threats and respond flexibly to evolving security challenges.
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