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INTRODUCING THE BUSINESS IMPLEMENTATION INSTITUTION: A CROSS-REGIME ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES VIA AGENT-BASED SIMULATION

ВПРОВАДЖЕННЯ ІНСТИТУЦІЇ РЕАЛІЗАЦІЇ БІЗНЕСУ: КРОС-РЕЖИМНИЙ АНАЛІЗ ІНСТИТУЦІЙНИХ СТРАТЕГІЙ ІЗ ЗАСТОСУВАННЯМ АГЕНТНОГО МОДЕЛЮВАННЯ

Summary. This study introduces the concept of the Business Implementation Institution (BII) as a missing analytical layer in institutional and strategic management theory. The BII is defined as an integrative system combining formal rules, informal norms, organizational structures, and interaction mechanisms that enable the realization of economic activity. To validate the analytical relevance of this concept, the study employs an agent-based modelling approach based on an extended Axelrod tournament. The study contributes to institutional economics by introducing a functional-integrative concept of implementation and by demonstrating its applicability through simulation-based analysis of complex institutional environments.

Keywords: Business Implementation Institution, institutional economics, agent-based modeling, evolutionary games, economic coordination, hierarchy, artificial intelligence.

Анотація. У цьому дослідженні представлено концепцію Інституції реалізації бізнесу (ІРБ) як відсутнього аналітичного рівня в теорії інституційного та стратегічного управління. Хоча існуючі рамки зосереджені на правилах (інститутах), структурах управління або можливостях на рівні фірми, вони не чітко відображають, як бізнес-стратегії впроваджуються в складних та гетерогенних середовищах. ІРБ визначається як інтегративна система, що поєднує формальні правила, неформальні норми, організаційні структури та механізми взаємодії, що дозволяють реалізувати економічну діяльність. Для підтвердження аналітичної актуальності цієї концепції в дослідженні використовується агентний підхід моделювання, заснований на розширеному турнірі Аксельрода. Інституційні актори моделюються як стратегічні агенти, що взаємодіють у трьох режимах – конкуренції (Дилема в'язня), координації (Полювання на оленя) та ієрархії (Гра підпорядкування) – зі стохастичним перемиканням та парно-специфічними ієрархічними відносинами. Результати моделювання, засновані на множинних прогонах зі статистичною агрегацією, показують структурну різницю між інституційними стратегіями, орієнтованими на ефективність, та орієнтованими на стабільність. Екологічні інституції досягають найвищих середніх виграшів у різних сценаріях, що відображає їхню відповідність динаміці співпраці, тоді як ІРБ демонструє стабільно високу та надійну продуктивність у всіх режимах взаємодії. Ці результати свідчать про те, що ІРБ функціонує як міжрежимний стабілізатор, надаючи пріоритет адаптивності та системній стійкості над короткостроковою максимізацією ефективності. Дослідження робить внесок в інституційну економіку, вводячи функціонально-інтегративну концепцію реалізації та демонструючи її застосовність за допомогою симуляційного аналізу складних інституційних середовищ. Акцент на реалізації безпосередньо допомагає визначити стратегію, забезпечуючи функціонально-інтегративну основу, яка гарантує узгодженість стратегічного вибору з механізмами виконання. Як окрема аналітична конструкція, ІРБ дозволяє дослідникам розглядати інституції як рівноправні детермінанти стратегії, а не просто як фонове середовище для поведінки фірми.

Ключові слова: Інституція реалізації бізнесу, інституційна економіка, агентно-орієнтоване моделювання, еволюційні ігри, економічна координація, ієрархія, штучний інтелект.

Problem statement. The institutional structure of society has not become a priority in the implementation of economic reforms in Ukraine, as well as in many other countries of the world. As a result, the processes of privatization and public administration have not been institutionally ensured. This mistake has made it possible for a whole range of oligarchic regimes to emerge. At the same time, the post-Washington consensus has clearly demonstrated the scientific community's understanding of the need to take into account national specifics and the state of social and market institutions, and has launched a new wave of institutional reforms in developing countries. At the same time, this has become an impetus for the emergence of new scientific research in this area. They mainly focus their attention on the institution of local governance, the court system, the law enforcement and electoral systems. The institution of business implementation is in secondary positions and has not been considered at this point as a holistic inter-sectoral mechanism that functions in conditions of multi-level interactions and is characterized by an extremely wide range of tools.

At the same time, there is no holistic vision that covers interinstitutional interaction, tools for assessing and forecasting both the institutional system as a whole and its elements.

The view of business as an institutional environment, a process, an object of prediction and assessment is not a very common phenomenon. Here it would be appropriate to use the term business institution or business implementation mechanism. The differences in the terms institute and institution are understandable. The rules and norms in the first case are meant, respectively, and the mechanism of functioning as a single whole in the second as a combination of norms and organizational elements in order to implement specific functions. The historical retrospective of the use of these terms creates, unfortunately, a certain chaos of definitions. For further use, the term "business implementation institution" was chosen.

In world practice, a range of similar terms is used, which at the same time are not complete substitutes. If we are talking about structural and organizational conditions, the term institutional framework for business is used; if we analyze a complex of formal and informal rules, the basic term is institutional arrangements for business; if the emphasis is on the development environment, it is better to use the term entrepreneurial ecosystem. We want to combine environment, process, assessment, and prediction (only partially covered by the proposed equivalents), which is best combined with the term institution. It is obvious that such an analysis is possible only in the presence of the implementation factor.

Analysis of recent research and publications. North D. C. [4] and Williamson O. E. [8] practically proposed to consider institutions as separate players in economic interactions. Moreover, a mechanism for quantifying the role of such institutions was proposed. Teece D.J. [7] develops the dynamic capabilities framework into a more explicit system of interactions between firms, markets, and environments. Although not labeled as "institutional theory," it clearly implies institutional-like coordination mechanisms. Fundamentally important for our study is the concept of the institutional matrix of interaction between formal and informal institutions proposed by Zelenko H.I. et al. [9].

Recent studies emphasize the growing importance of implementation layers in modern economies. Jacobides M. G., Cennamo C., Gawer A. [2] move toward a system-level theory of economic organization, where ecosystems function as structured arenas of interaction. The authors argue that ecosystems are neither traditional markets nor hierarchies, but a third organizational form characterized by: modularity of components, interdependence among actors, and absence of full hierarchical control. Institutionally, ecosystems represent decentralized but structured coordination systems, where rules are shared yet not centrally enforced like in firms. A central contribution is the idea that ecosystems are organized around: roles, positions in the value architecture, access and participation rules.

Unlike pure markets, these rules are often designed or influenced by a focal firm, but not fully controlled. Ecosystems function effectively only when complementary activities are aligned: technical compatibility, strategic incentives of participants, timing and co-specialization of investments. The authors determine an ecosystem as "a set of actors with varying degrees of multilateral, nongeneric complementarities that are not fully hierarchically controlled".

Similarly, Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. [1] highlight that technological progress, particularly AI, transforms not only productivity but also the institutional structure through which decisions are executed, often shifting power toward those who control implementation infrastructures.

Furthermore, research on the 'strategy–execution gap' (e.g., Mankins M. & Steele R. [3], updated discussions in 2021–2022 literature) shows that firms systematically fail not because of poor strategy, but due to weak implementation systems. This directly supports the need for a concept such as BII.

Peng M.W., Wang D.Y.L., and Jiang Y. [5] are much closer to explicit institutional theory. For them institutions are like a Third Pillar of Strategy. The central argument is that firm strategy is shaped by three interacting forces: industry conditions, firm resources, and institutional frameworks. Institutions are not just background – they actively constrain and enable strategic choices. The authors distinguish between: formal institutions (laws, regulations, policies) and informal institutions (norms, culture, networks). These jointly define the "rules of the

game" and directions of influence. Institutionally, this implies multi-layered governance, where firms must align with both legal systems and socially embedded norms. A key contribution is the focus on institutional voids – situations where market-supporting institutions are weak or absent.

Srnicek N. Platform Capitalism [6] is not framed in classical institutional theory language, but it clearly implies a set of institutional interactions between firms, states, and markets. He discussed platforms as new institutional intermediaries.

Platforms are not just firms; they function as infrastructure-like institutions that mediate interactions between multiple actors. Srnicek emphasizes that the core resource of platform capitalism is data, which generates asymmetrical power relations. Institutionally, this creates a shift from price-based market coordination to data-driven governance, where power stems from control of information flows. Platforms do not operate outside the state; instead, there is a co-evolutionary relationship. This reflects a hybrid institutional order where public and private authority overlap and platforms act as semi-autonomous institutional actors within state-backed systems.

This analysis allows us to assess the role of artificial intelligence and technology differently – to see them as a separate institution. We intend to briefly interpret it in our further assessments as AI and other technologies.

The aim of this article is to single out the business implementation institution by determining its strategy as a separate equal player among the spectrum of other institutions and as a cross-regime stabilizer, maintaining systemic resilience and high performance across competitive, coordinative, and hierarchical regimes. In this way, by combining the tools of institutional economics and game theory, it is aimed to propose a toolkit for quantitative and qualitative assessment of the role of the business implementation institution.

Summary of the main research material. BII is considered as a multi-level system integrating formal rules, informal norms, organizational structures, and interaction environments. It enables analysis of how business is not only regulated but actually implemented. BII synthesizes institutional frameworks, ecosystems, and implementation mechanisms into a unified analytical construct. According to our approach it operates through three roles: condition-setting, mechanism-building, and outcome-generation, capturing execution as a core institutional function. It is introduced as an intermediate analytical layer between institutions and outcomes, bridging a major gap in institutional economics.

In first part of our research we realize an agent-based modelling approach based on Prisoner Dilemma (PD) and Axelrod tournament mechanism.

To operationalize the concept of the Business Implementation Institution (BII), this study employs an agent-based modelling approach using the Axelrod tournament framework. This approach allows us to simulate strategic interactions between institutional agents under repeated game conditions.

Each agent represents a distinct institutional logic influencing business implementation processes. The strategies are not interpreted as individual firms, but as institutionalized behavioural patterns that shape decision-making, coordination, and execution.

The following institutional agents are introduced:

Business Implementation Institution (BII) – it represents an adaptive coordination mechanism that balances cooperation and enforcement. It is modelled as a conditional Cooperator with memory and selective retaliation, approximating strategies such as Win-Stay Lose-Shift combined with Tit-for-Tat.

Artificial Intelligence & Tech Platforms (AI-Tech) – it captures algorithmic decision-making and platform governance. This agent adapts dynamically based on accumulated interactions and payoff optimization, approximating reinforcement learning behavior (e.g., Adaptive or Q-learning strategies).

Informal Networks (Guanxi / Cronyism / Political Clusters) – it represents trust-based, non-transparent coordination systems. This agent exhibits strong in-group cooperation and out-group defection, similar to tag-based strategies or conditional cooperation with bias.

Environmental Institutions (Green Governance) – it models actors prioritizing long-term sustainability over short-term payoff. This strategy cooperates initially but punishes persistent defection, resembling Generous Tit-for-Tat or Forgiver.

Economic Nationalism (Protectionist Policy Regimes) – it represents state-driven strategic behavior prioritizing domestic advantage. This agent tends toward defection with occasional cooperation under strategic benefit, similar to Grudger or Suspicious Tit-for-Tat.

The interaction environment initially is defined as an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with stochastic noise, allowing us to observe stability, dominance, and adaptability of institutional strategies.

The key objective is to evaluate how the presence of a Business Implementation Institution affects system cooperation, resilience under shocks, and dominance of opportunistic against cooperative strategies.

This framework allows us to interpret BII not only as a conceptual construct but as a measurable coordination mechanism within complex institutional systems.

As result of Axelrod tournament conducted using traditional Python package "Axelrod" we achieve the ranking of tournament winners:

1. Environmental (ENV).
2. Business Implementation Institution (BII).
3. AI Tech.
4. Economic Nationalism (NAT).
5. Guanxi-like.

Echoing with Jacobides, Cennamo & Gawer [2] we presented ecosystems function as structured

arenas of institutions interaction. In some way it is also reflection of Srnicek's Platform Capitalism [6].

The Environmental is situated in the first place. This is not accidental and even quite expected. This strategy assumes cooperation by default, punishment only after accumulated defections. This is a class of Generous/Forgiving strategies. Such strategies maximize long-term payoff, work well in a mixed environment, and are not destroying cooperation due to "noise". Sustainability-oriented institutions dominate because they stabilize cooperation without over-penalizing deviations.

BII is ranked second. Our BII is conditional cooperation, a quick punishment for defection. This is quite close to Tit-for-Tat / WSLS. BII does not maximize the payoff, but balances the system. This strategy is effective, but is "softer" than the previous Environmental. It is a little more punishing, and therefore loses some cooperation. BII acts as a stabilizer rather than a maximizer.

AI Tech is situated in the middle of the ranking. Its strategy is a simple adaptation (as reactive). AI here has no memory or deep learning, does not build trust, and does not form stable cooperation. AI without institutional embedding behaves opportunistically rather than coordinative.

Economic Nationalism is below average. Here, this strategy has a defection start, cautious cooperation destroys trust on the early stages, and such player receives punishment from others. Protectionist strategies reduce systemic cooperation and suffer from retaliation effects.

The Guanxi-like Strategy shows a remarkable last place. The logic of this strategy is cooperation at first, then defection. This creates short-term trust, but ultimately destroys it. Informal institutions fail in open heterogeneous systems due to lack of scalability and transparency.

This result shows that the system wins when there is present soft cooperation (Environmental) and structured coordination (BII).

The simulation results demonstrate that cooperation-oriented institutional strategies outperform opportunistic and selective coordination mechanisms. Environmental institutions achieve the highest performance due to their ability to sustain cooperation while tolerating occasional deviations.

The Business Implementation Institution ranks second, confirming its role as a systemic stabilizer rather than a payoff-maximizing agent. This supports the theoretical proposition that BII functions as a coordination layer that maintains equilibrium in heterogeneous institutional environments.

In contrast, informal network-based strategies and economic nationalism exhibit lower performance due to their inability to sustain trust and cooperation in diverse interaction settings. AI – driven strategies show intermediate results, suggesting that without institutional embedding, technological agents do not inherently produce cooperative outcomes.

In the second part of our research we concentrate on scenario based approach. By combining stochastic interaction regimes (competition and coordination) with persistent hierarchical ties, the model captures the coexistence of markets, networks, and power structures within a unified analytical framework.

For the three proposed scenarios – combinations of PD (competition), Stag Hunt (coordination) and Subordination (hierarchical gradation) we achieve the next result of the interaction of institutions in repeated games (Tabl. 1):

Table 1 – Scenarios

Scenario: PD=0.7, Stag=0.2, Sub=0.1	**Scenario: PD=0.3, Stag=0.5, Sub=0.2**	**Scenario: PD=0.2, Stag=0.2, Sub=0.6**
ENV 1394	BII 1373	BII 2235
BII 1318	AI 1323	AI 965
G 547	ENV 1286	G 793
AI 504	NAT 855	ENV 625
NAT 91	G 584	NAT 446

Source: own calculation based on extended Axelrod tournament and Python

Practically it was created three different "worlds" (Tabl. 2).

Table 2 – Scenarios based on priorities

Scenario	**Type of economy**
0.7 PD	Mainly competitive/ conflict based
0.5 Stag	Mainly coordinative
0.6 Sub	Mainly hierarchical

Source: own elaboration

And the main conclusion is that there is no universal winner, except for BII. BII is the only strategy that is: #2 in competition, #1 in cooperation, #1 in hierarchy. *BII is not optimal in a single regime – it is optimal across regimes.*

Scenario 1: Competition (PD dominates)

What happens here: Environmental unexpectedly has a leadership. Its "soft cooperation" survives conflict, does not enter into a spiral of revenge. Long-term cooperation beats aggressive defection even in competitive environments. BII is situated very close, punishes, but does not destroy the system. A structured reciprocity is nearly as effective as sustainability logic. NAT (economic nationalism) fails. Permanent defection provokes everyone punishes. Protectionism destroys payoff in open systems.

Scenario 2: Coordination (Stag Hunt dominates)

Here the picture is different: BII occupies a first place. This is very logical: cooperation and control does not allow upsetting the balance. AI has grown dramatically: imitation works well in a stable environment. AI amplifies existing coordination structures. ENV is no longer the first: too "soft" strategy does not optimize payoff.

Scenario 3: Hierarchy (Sub dominates)

Here is the most interesting result: BII is the absolute leader. This is critically important, since such a strategy does not destroy the hierarchy, but also does not allow itself to be completely exploited. BII stabilizes hierarchy without collapsing into domination. AI is the second, adapts well to dominance. ENV is falling: it is "exploited" in the hierarchy. NAT is weak again: even in a world of hierarchy, hard defection does not win.

Our results show that there are 3 types of institutions: single-regime specialists (ENV (cooperation), NAT (conflict)), Context-dependent (AI, Guanxi), Cross-regime stabilizer (BII).

The simulation results reveal a critical distinction between regime-specific and cross-regime institutional strategies. While certain agents perform well under specific conditions (e.g., environmental institutions in cooperative settings), only the Business Implementation Institution demonstrates consistently high performance across all interaction regimes.

In competitive environments, cooperation-oriented strategies dominate, whereas in coordination-based settings, adaptive strategies such as AI gain prominence. In hierarchical regimes, most strategies suffer from exploitation or instability.

The BII, however, emerges as a cross-regime stabilizer, capable of maintaining cooperation, enforcing discipline, and adapting to hierarchical structures simultaneously. This supports the theoretical proposition that BII represents an institutional layer responsible not for maximizing short-term payoffs, but for *ensuring systemic stability across heterogeneous environments.*

We got a very interesting result, but it depends on: the payoff_Sub parameters (they are too aggressive in our version of the subordination game: (C,C): (8,-2), (D,D): (0,0), (C,D): (3,5), (D,C): (10,-2)), the lack of learning in the AI, and a single run of the model (next it will be proposed 100). After making the appropriate edits to the code, we will receive a corrected and supplemented result (Tabl. 3).

The main change after the fixes: BII used to dominate. Now ENV is consistently #1 in all scenarios. This means: our model is now less "artificial" and more reflective of reality.

We again received three different scenarios that needed to be described.

Scenario 1: Competition (PD=0.7)

Among major players ENV (1081 ± 89) is statistically higher than BII (993 ± 122). It means that long-term cooperation wins even in a competitive environment.

Scenario 2: coordination (Stag = 0.5)

Among main players ENV (1215 ± 135) is ahead again. Everything is logical, since Stag Hunt is presenting a world of cooperation and ENV is optimally suited for this strategy.

Scenario 3: hierarchy (Sub=0.6)

Now strongest players ENV (1245 ± 162) and BII (1212 ± 154) are very close or even almost overlapping. There is no clear leader.

Our result means that ENV is acting as a specialist, BII is acting as a generalist.

The results indicate a clear distinction between specialized and adaptive institutional strategies. Environmental institutions consistently achieve the highest average payoffs across all scenarios, reflecting their strong alignment with cooperative dynamics. However, the Business Implementation Institution demonstrates robust performance across all regimes, maintaining high payoffs under competitive, cooperative, and hierarchical conditions. While it does not always maximize outcomes, it exhibits lower sensitivity to changes in interaction structure.

This suggests that BII functions as a generalist institutional mechanism, optimizing system stability rather than peak performance in any single regime. We unanimously with Teece [7] confirmed the acting of this particular institution as a coordination mechanism. Let's pay attention to the standard deviation level (Tabl. 4), that allows us to determine unstable role of AI and other instruments.

Table 4 – Deviation based analysis

Strategy	Stability
ENV	stable
BII	stable
AI	very unstable

Source: own elaboration

Also very important is to emphasize: ENV maximizes payoff, but only under "normal" conditions. BII does not maximize but adapts, not stabilizes. BII trades efficiency for robustness.

Table 3 – Extended model

Scenario: PD=0.7, Stag=0.2, Sub=0.1	Scenario: PD=0.3, Stag=0.5, Sub=0.2	Scenario: PD=0.2, Stag=0.2, Sub=0.6
BII: mean=993.23, std=122.38	BII: mean=1093.60, std=139.60	BII: mean=1212.77, std=153.99
AI: mean=757.54, std=181.05	AI: mean=844.69, std=201.23	AI: mean=1023.52, std=227.44
G: mean=711.31, std=81.72	G: mean=841.07, std=84.47	G: mean=940.79, std=93.19
ENV: mean=1081.29, std=88.98	ENV: mean=1215.87, std=134.72	ENV: mean=1245.08, std=162.38
NAT: mean=900.28, std=72.07	NAT: mean=932.87, std=108.88	NAT: mean=996.80, std=148.70

Source: own calculation based on extended Axelrod tournament and Python.

Our results show that the economy has 2 types of institutions: efficiency – maximizers (Environmental as example), system-stabilizers (BII as example). ENV wins everywhere. The reason is that it is too "perfect"; it is almost not punished in Subordinate game.

The findings highlight a fundamental trade-off between efficiency and robustness in institutional design. While cooperation-oriented institutions achieve the highest average performance, they remain sensitive to structural variations in interaction regimes.

In contrast, the Business Implementation Institution demonstrates consistent performance across heterogeneous environments, suggesting its role as a stabilizing mechanism in complex economic systems. This supports the interpretation of BII as an institutional layer that ensures adaptability and resilience rather than maximizing short-term efficiency.

Conclusions. The game theory models employed demonstrate: the BII is a distinct stabilizing institution that bridges the fundamental gap between formal and informal rules and realized economic outcomes.

The emphasis on implementation directly helps to define strategy, providing a functional-integrative framework that ensures that strategic choices are consistent with implementation mechanisms. In this way, it becomes possible to apply an extended Axelrod tournament between the most significant institutions in the researcher's opinion.

It was also found that in complex composed environments based on competition, coordination and subordination, the BII functions as a cross-regime stabilizer, supporting systemic stability and high productivity in competitive, coordination and hierarchical regimes. The BII is a "universal" that balances cooperation and enforcement to achieve reliable results regardless of the structure of interaction.

The proposed approach to assessing institutional interaction can be used to analyse economic reforms in terms of the relationships they cause influencing cooperative, competitive, and subordinate relationships between business, society and government structures.

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